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Abstract 
The processing of personal changes across time and the ability to differentiate between 
representations of present and past selves are crucial for developing a mature sense of 
identity. In this study, we explored the neural correlates of self-reflection across time using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). College undergraduates were asked to reflect 
on their own psychological characteristics and those of an intimate other, for both the present 
time period (i.e., at college) and a past time period (i.e., high school years) that involved 
significant personal changes. Cortical midline structures (CMS) were commonly recruited by 
the four reflective tasks (reflecting on the present self, past self, present other, and past other), 
relative to a control condition (making valence judgments). More importantly, however, the 
degree of activity in CMS also varied significantly according to the target of reflection, with 
the ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex being more 
recruited when reflecting on the present self than when reflecting on the past self or when 
reflecting on the other person. These findings suggest that CMS may contribute to 
differentiate between representations of present and past selves. 
 
Keywords: self; fMRI; medial prefrontal cortex; time 
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The sense of continuity of self across time is an essential aspect of human consciousness 
(Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; Morin, 2006), which when disturbed can lead to severe 
mental disorders such as schizophrenia (Vogeley and Kupke, 2007). This sense of personal 
continuity is intimately related to autobiographical memory and emerges, in particular, from 
the creation of internalized narratives that integrate temporally disparate self-elements into a 
coherent whole (Conway, 2005; McAdams, 2001). Continuity does not mean total sameness, 
however. Life circumstances are continually evolving and when significant changes occur 
(e.g., changing job, getting married, moving to a new country), the self-concept is updated 
and remodelled to take these alterations into account (Demo, 1992; Deutsch et al., 1988). 
Thus, besides the creation of a sense of continuity, the processing of personal changes across 
time and the ability to differentiate between representations of present and past selves are 
important components of self-processing. In particular, they probably play a critical role in the 
formation and consolidation of a stable identity during late adolescence and early adulthood 
(McAdams, 2001).  
Recent research in social psychology has started to investigate the process by which 
people differentiate between representations of present and past selves. There is evidence that 
when people perceive they have changed, they tend to distance themselves from their past self 
and regard it as “another person” (Libby and Eibach, 2002; Pronin and Ross, 2006). For 
example, people frequently adopt a third-person visual perspective when recalling past 
behaviors that are discrepant with their present self-concept, as if they were looking at 
someone else (Libby and Eibach, 2002). Furthermore, attributions made about past selves 
more closely resemble attributions made about others than attributions regarding the present 
self (e.g., in terms of the tendency to make dispositional attributions; Pronin and Ross, 2006). 
Therefore, it seems that following personal changes, people process information regarding 
their past self as they would process information regarding others. This distancing mechanism 
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with regard to past selves may help differentiate representations of present self-attributes from 
representations of past self-attributes. The purpose of this study was to investigate the brain 
regions that may contribute to this process.  
Functional brain imaging studies have revealed activations in cortical midline 
structures (CMS) when people reflect on psychological characteristics (Craik et al., 1999; 
D'Argembeau et al., 2005, 2007; Fossati et al., 2003; Heatherton et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 
2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Kjaer et al., 2002; Lieberman et al., 2004; Lou et al., 2004; Mitchell 
et al., 2005; Moran et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Pfeifer et al., 2007; Saxe et al., 2006; 
Schmitz et al., 2004). CMS are recruited when reflecting on one’s own characteristics as well 
as those of others (for reviews, see Amodio and Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2007), but research 
nevertheless suggests that these brain structures are more engaged when referring to the self 
(see Northoff et al., 2006, for a meta-analysis). For example, assessing whether psychological 
traits are self-descriptive elicited greater activity in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and 
medial posterior regions (in the posterior cingulate and/or precuneus) compared to assessing 
whether traits apply to another person (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Heatherton et al., 2006; 
Kelley et al., 2002; Pfeifer et al., 2007). These studies were only interested in the neural 
correlates of thinking about the present self, however; hence, it is currently unknown whether 
CMS respond differently to representations of past selves. As the perception of personal 
changes across time leads people to regard their past selves as other persons (Libby and 
Eibach, 2002; Pronin and Ross, 2006), we hypothesized that CMS activity should be sensitive 
to temporal perspectives on the self, and more specifically, that reflecting on a past self should 
elicit less activity in these structures than reflecting on the present self. In this way, CMS may 
help differentiate between representations of present and past selves. 
To examine this issue, we collected fMRI data while participants reflected on their 
own psychological characteristics and those of an intimate other, for both the present and a 
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past time period. The transition from high school to college entails important changes in the 
self (Libby and Eibach, 2002), which makes it an ideal period for studying how people 
differentiate between representations of present and past selves. Accordingly, we asked 
college undergraduates to reflect on their present self (i.e., at college) and their self five years 
ago (i.e., when they were at high school); hence, judgments they made targeted two clearly 
distinct lifetime periods (i.e., periods associated with different goals, locations, people, 
activities, and so forth; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The tasks consisted in making 
judgments on a series of adjectives describing psychological traits. In a first condition, 
participants assessed whether or not each adjective was descriptive of their present self, 
whereas in a second condition they assessed whether or not the adjectives described their past 
self. Two other conditions required participants to judge the adjectives in reference to the 
present and past traits of an intimate other. Finally, a control task was also included (assessing 
the valence of each adjective), which involved semantic processing but did not require to 





Data were acquired from couples of close friends (8 women, 8 men) or siblings (2 women, 2 
men) who knew each other for at least 5 years. All were right-handed French-speaking college 
undergraduates (aged between 20 and 23 years; mean age = 21 years). All participants gave 
their written informed consent to take part in the study, which was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Medical School of the University of Liège. None of them had any history of 




Participants made different types of judgments on a series of adjectives describing 
psychological traits. More specifically, they were asked to assess whether or not the adjectives 
described their current psychological characteristics (present self), their characteristics 5 years 
ago (past self), their friend’s current characteristics (present other), and their friend’s 
characteristics 5 years ago (past other). All participants were at high school 5 years ago, 
whereas they currently were college undergraduates. Furthermore, most of them had moved to 
another city to come to the university. Judgments about the past versus the present thus 
targeted clearly distinct lifetime periods (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). A control 
condition was also included (judging whether or not the adjectives designated a positive trait), 
which involved semantic processing but did not require to reflect on the psychological 
characteristics of a particular person. 
The same set of 40 trait adjectives [20 positive and 20 negative adjectives selected 
from Anderson’s (1968) list; e.g. modest, shy] was used in all five conditions. We decided to 
use the same set of adjectives for all judgment conditions in order to closely follow previous 
behavioral studies on which this work was based (e.g., Pronin and Ross, 2006). In addition, it 
allowed us to assess perceived changes in personal characteristics across time. The five 
conditions were presented within a single session, using a block design1. There were 10 
blocks per condition, with each block consisting of four trials. Before the start of each block, 
an instruction cue appeared on the screen (for a variable duration comprised between 3000 
and 3500 ms: random Gaussian distribution centered on a mean duration of 3250 ms) to 
inform participants about the type of judgment they had to make for the adjectives presented 
                                                 
1 We used a block design in this study because pilot testing revealed that some participants experienced difficulty 
in switching between the present and past time periods on each trial. It has been argued that employing a 
blocked-design approach may result in weaker differences in MPFC activity between conditions, especially 
when inter-trial intervals are long (see Heatherton et al., 2006, for further discussion of this issue). Therefore, 
short inter-trial intervals were used in this study (mean duration of 875 ms). Using a similar block design in an 
earlier study, we were previously able to observe significant differences in CMS activity for judgments targeting 
the self vs an intimate other (D’Argembeau et al., 2007).  
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subsequently [present self: At present, I am; past self: Five years ago, I was; present other: At 
present, X is (where X was replaced by the friend’s first name); past other: Five years ago, X 
was (where X was replaced by the friend’s first name); control: Positive trait]. The four trials 
were then presented sequentially. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a fixation cross 
first (for a variable duration: random Gaussian distribution centered on a mean duration of 
875 ms) and then of an adjective (for 3500 ms, during which participants made a yes/no 
decision by pressing one of two buttons). After each block, the screen was emptied (for a 
variable duration: random Gaussian distribution centered on a mean duration of 550 ms) 
before the instruction pertaining to the next block was presented.  
Blocks were presented in pseudo-random order, such that all five conditions were 
presented before their presentation was repeated and with the restriction that two blocks of the 
same condition could not be repeated immediately and could not be separated by more than 
six blocks of a different condition. Furthermore, the 40 adjectives were all presented before 
their presentation was repeated, thus ensuring that possible repetition effects were not 
confounded with conditions (i.e., each condition included 8 adjectives that were presented for 
the first time, 8 adjectives that were presented for the second time, 8 adjectives that were 
presented for the third time, 8 adjectives that were presented for the fourth time, and 8 
adjectives that were presented for the fifth time). Each block consisted of two positive and 
two negative adjectives presented in random order.  
Before the fMRI session, participants were asked to take a few minutes to think about 
their life 5 years ago (the experimenter helped them to remember this period by asking 
questions such as how old they were, what school they went to, and so forth) and about their 
present life. Participants were instructed to keep in mind the past or present lifetime period 
when making the corresponding judgments. Then, they made a series of practice trials (with a 
different set of adjectives) in order to familiarize them with the five types of judgments. After 
 8
the fMRI session, participants were asked to rate the overall ease/difficulty with which they 
made each type of judgments in the scanner (using a 10-point rating scale: 1 = not at all 
difficult, 10 = very difficult). 
 
MRI acquisition 
Data were acquired on a 3Tesla scanner (Siemens, Allegra, Erlangen, Germany) using a T2* 
sensitive gradient echo EPI sequence (TR = 2130 ms, TE = 40 ms, FA 90°, matrix size 64 X 
64 X 32, voxel size 3.4 X 3.4 X 3.4 mm³). Thirty-two 3-mm thick transverse slices (FOV 22 
X 22 cm²) were acquired, with a distance factor of 30%, covering the whole brain. Around 
540 functional volumes were obtained. The first three volumes were discarded to account for 
T1 saturation. A structural MR scan was obtained at the end of the session (T1-weighted 3D 
MP-RAGE sequence, TR = 1960 ms, TE = 4.4 ms, FOV 23 X 23 cm², matrix size 256 X 256 
X 176, voxel size 0.9 X 0.9 X 0.9 mm). Head movement was minimized by restraining the 
subject’s head using a vacuum cushion. Stimuli were displayed on a screen positioned at the 
rear of the scanner, which the subject could comfortably see through a mirror mounted on the 
standard head coil. 
 
fMRI analyses 
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, http//www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc., 
Sherborn, MA). Functional scans were realigned using iterative rigid body transformations 
that minimize the residual sum of squares between the first and subsequent images. They were 
normalized to the MNI EPI template (voxel size: 2 X 2 X 2 mm) and spatially smoothed with 
a Gaussian kernel with full-width at half maximum (FWHM) of 8 mm.  
 9
For each participant, BOLD responses were modeled at each voxel, using a general 
linear model with epoch regressors. All five conditions (present self, past self, present other, 
past other, control) were included in the model. For each condition, each epoch ranged from 
the onset of the first adjective on the screen until the last adjective disappeared from the 
screen. Boxcar functions representative of these epoch regressors were convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response. The design matrix also included the realignment 
parameters to account for any residual movement-related effect. A high pass filter was 
implemented using a cut-off period of 128 s in order to remove the low-frequency drifts from 
the time series. Serial autocorrelations were estimated with a restricted maximum likelihood 
algorithm with an autoregressive model of order 1 (+ white noise). Four linear contrasts were 
performed, looking at the effect of each reflective task relative to the control task (present self 
– control; past self – control; present other – control; past other – control). The corresponding 
contrast images were smoothed (6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel) in order to reduce remaining 
noise due to inter-subject differences in anatomical variability in the individual contrast 
images. They were then entered in a second-level analysis, corresponding to a random-effects 
model.  
To examine brain regions that were commonly engaged by the four reflective tasks 
relative to the control task, a conjunction analysis (conjunction null; Friston et al., 2005) was 
performed with the four contrast images. Next, in order to identify brain regions that showed 
differential activity across reflective tasks, the four contrast images were entered in a one-way 
whole-brain voxel-wise ANOVA (using a single task factor with four levels) [1 -1 0 0; 0 1 -1 
0; 0 0 1 -1]. Correction for non-sphericity was used to account for possible differences in error 
variance across conditions and any non-independent error terms for the repeated-measures 
ANOVA. The resulting set of voxel values was thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected). 
Statistical inferences were corrected for multiple comparisons using Gaussian random field 
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theory at the voxel level in a small spherical volume (radius 10 mm) around a priori locations 
of structure of interest taken from the literature on self-referential processing. We selected 
coordinates of brain regions that have been associated with reflecting on the present self using 
tasks similar to the one employed in this study (i.e., judging trait information). These regions 
concerned areas in the ventral MPFC (-8, 50, -2; -4, 58, -12; D'Argembeau et al., 2007; 
Lieberman et al., 2004), the dorsal MPFC (-6, 52, 28; Pfeifer et al., 2007) (in this study, we 
refer to ventral MPFC for z coordinate ≤ 10 mm and to dorsal MPFC for z coordinate > 10 
mm), and medial posterior areas (posterior cingulate cortex, PCC: -2, -62, 32; Johnson et al., 
2002).  
Finally, region of interest (ROI) analyses were conducted to further explore patterns of 
activity in ventral MPFC, dorsal MPFC, and PCC across conditions. Functional ROIs were 
defined using 6 mm radius spheres around the local maxima of the MPFC and PCC activation 
clusters yielded by the whole-brain voxel-wise ANOVA. Parameter estimates from these 
regions were extracted for each participant and each contrast (present self – control; past self 
– control; present other – control; past other – control) and were submitted to a series of one-
way repeated-measures ANOVAs. Significant differences between conditions were then 
assessed using paired t-tests. These analyses were performed with STATISTICA 7.1 (StatSoft 




Response times differed significantly across conditions, as revealed by a one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA, F(4, 76) = 5.57, p = .001. Follow-up comparisons showed that 
response times were faster for the control task (M = 1570 ms, SD = 267) compared to each 
reflective task (present self: M = 1674 ms, SD = 250; past self: M = 1735 ms, SD = 258; 
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present other: M = 1696 ms, SD = 277; past other: M = 1732 ms, SD = 250; all ps < .05). 
However, the four reflective tasks did not differ from each other (all ps > .13). To estimate 
perceived changes in personal characteristics across time, we computed the percentages of 
adjectives for which participants gave a different answer between the present and the past. 
There was a substantial amount of perceived changes for both self (M = 29%, SD = 10%) and 
other (M = 25%, SD = 12%)2, with no significant difference between self and other, t(19) = 
1.10, p = .28.  
Ratings for difficulty in making judgments differed significantly across conditions, 
F(4, 76) = 15.99, p < .001. Follow-up comparisons showed that the control task was rated as 
being easier (M = 2.25, SD = 1.68) than each reflective task (past self: M = 4.20, SD = 1.82; 
present other: M = 3.55, SD = 1.76; past other: M = 5.15, SD = 2.46; all ps < .05), except the 
present self (M = 2.60, SD = 1.57). Furthermore, the present self was rated as being easier 
than past self and past other, and the present other was rated as being easier than past other 
(all ps < .05); all other comparisons were not significant (all ps > .16).  
 
fMRI data 
We first investigated the brain regions that were commonly engaged by the four 
reflective tasks (judgments regarding the present self, past self, present other, and past other) 
relative to the control task (valence judgments), using a conjunction analysis (see Methods). 
As shown in Figure 1a, this analysis revealed activations in the ventral MPFC (MNI 
coordinates of peak voxel: 0, 54, -12; Z-score = 4.52, pSVC < 0.001), the dorsal MPFC (MNI 
                                                 
2 In this study, we used a yes/no response format to simplify motor responses. Estimates of perceived changes 
might have been even higher if participants had the opportunity to make more nuanced responses (e.g., by using 
a Likert-type scale). Furthermore, there is evidence that people make dispositional attributions more often when 
reflecting on their past self than when reflecting on their present self, a processing difference that could not be 
captured by the yes/no response format (Pronin and Ross, 2006). Thus, it is likely that the present indexes 
actually underestimated perceived changes across time. 
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coordinates of peak voxel: -2, 54, 24; Z-score = 4.00, pSVC = 0.002), and the PCC (MNI 
coordinates of peak voxel: 6, -54, 28; Z-score = 5.85, pSVC < 0.001).  
Next we examined the brain regions that showed differential activity across the four 
reflective tasks by conducting a whole-brain voxel-wise ANOVA (see Methods). As shown in 
Figure 1b, differential activity occurred in the PCC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -2, -58, 
26; Z-score = 6.10, pSVC < 0.001) and in a large portion of MPFC that included both the 
ventral MPFC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -6, 54, -2; Z-score = 3.48, pSVC = 0.015) and 
the dorsal MPFC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -2, 56, 26; Z-score = 3.88, pSVC = 0.004). 
We then conducted region of interest (ROI) analyses to further specify patterns of activity in 
these regions (Figure 2). One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs showed significant 
differences between tasks in the three ROIs [ventral MPFC: F(3, 57) = 5.82, p = .002; dorsal 
MPFC: F(3, 57) = 3.81, p = .01; PCC: F(3, 57) = 10.67, p < .001] and paired t-tests further 
revealed that each of these regions was more recruited during reflection about the present self 
than when reflecting on the past self or when reflecting on the other person in the present or 
past [all t(19) ≥ 2.02, p ≤ .05]; the past self, present other, and past other did not differ from 
each other [all t(19) < 1.38, p > .18]. 
 
Additional analyses 
The main purpose of this study was to explore whether CMS activity varies as a 
function of the type of reflective task. Considering that CMS might show a graded response 
across tasks (e.g., highest activity for the present self condition, lowest activity for the present 
and past other conditions, with the past self condition falling in between), we analyzed data 
using a one-way ANOVA (see Methods) because this analysis would better capture such 
patterns of graded responses compared to the fully factorial (target x time) ANOVA. 
However, for the sake of completeness, we also report the results of the 2 (target: self vs 
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other) x 2 (time: present vs past) ANOVA. For each participant, four contrast images were 
computed (present self, past self, present other, past other) and were then entered in a two-
way whole-brain voxel-wise ANOVA (using two factors with two levels each) to examine the 
main effect of target, the main effect of time, and their interaction. We report brain regions 
that were significantly activated at p < .001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 
voxels (see Table 1 for MNI coordinates and F values).  
The brain regions that were associated with the main effect of target are shown in 
Table 1. Follow-up t-tests were computed to examine the direction of effects, which showed 
that the ventral and dorsal MPFC, the PCC, the lingual gyrus, and the right caudate nucleus 
were more activated for judgments targeting the self than for judgments targeting the other 
person. These findings are broadly consistent with previous studies of self-referential 
processing (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Heatherton et al., 2006; Moran et al., 2006). The 
right inferior frontal gyrus and the left inferior parietal lobule showed greater activation for 
other than for self.  
With regard to the main effect of time, the results showed that the lateral temporal 
cortex (the inferior and superior temporal gyrus bilaterally), the lateral prefrontal cortex (the 
inferior/middle frontal gyrus bilaterally), the precuneus, and the occipital cortex were more 
activated for judgments concerning the past than for judgments concerning the present. These 
regions have been associated with autobiographical memory (Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; 
Svoboda, McKinnon, and Levine, 2006) and may thus reflect the retrieval of semantic and 
sensory information regarding the past period participants had to refer to when making their 
judgements. The PCC and the left middle temporal gyrus were recruited to a greater extent for 
the present than for the past. 
Finally, there was a significant interaction between target and time in the dorsal 
MPFC, the PCC, and the left inferior frontal gyrus. Examination of average parameter 
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estimates (Figure 3) revealed that activity in the dorsal MPFC and PCC was higher for the 
present self than for the other three conditions, which is consistent with results of the one-way 
ANOVA (see above). Activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus is more difficult to interpret 
because it was higher for both the present self and past other conditions compared to the past 
self and present other conditions.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether CMS activity is sensitive to 
temporal perspectives on the self. To examine this issue, we collected fMRI data while 
participants reflected on their own psychological characteristics and those of an intimate 
other, for both the present and a past time period. The finding that CMS were recruited when 
reflecting on one’s own traits as well as those of another person (relative to valence 
judgments) confirms the general role of these brain structures in reflecting on mental states 
and psychological characteristics, be they one’s own or those of others (Amodio and Frith, 
2006; Lieberman, 2007). More importantly, however, the degree of activity in CMS also 
varied significantly according to the target of reflection. More specifically, reflecting on the 
present self elicited greater activity in the ventral and dorsal MPFC and PCC compared to 
reflecting on the past self or reflecting on an intimate other (in the present or past). 
Interestingly, the past self and other person conditions did not differ from each other, which 
fits well with recent findings that people perceive their past self as an “other” following 
significant personal changes (Libby and Eibach, 2002; Pronin and Ross, 2006). Thus, this 
study demonstrates that the level of activity in CMS is indeed sensitive to temporal 
perspectives on the self, suggesting that these brain structures may help differentiate between 
representations of present and past selves.  
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Along with others (e.g., Pfeifer et al., 2007), we do not believe that CMS are a storage 
site for self-knowledge, but rather that these structures support component processes that are 
recruited when reflecting on oneself. Northoff et al. (2006) recently argued that CMS mediate 
the process of relating stimuli to one’s own person (see also Schmitz and Johnson, 2007). The 
primary function of these structures would be to locate information on a continuum of self-
relatedness or self-relevance: the more activity a particular stimulus or mental content elicits 
in CMS, the more strongly it will be related to the self (Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff and 
Bermpohl, 2004; Schmitz and Johnson, 2007). In agreement with this view, it has been shown 
that CMS activity increased in a linear fashion with increasing self-relevance (Moran et al., 
2006). When reflecting on their own psychological characteristics, people can generate 
different mental models of themselves for different time periods (by retrieving relevant 
knowledge from semantic and/or episodic memory; Conway, 2005; Klein et al., 2002; Sakaki, 
2007), and CMS might index the degree to which a particular mental model refers to the 
present self. In other words, CMS might sustain the process of identifying oneself with the 
current mental model of the self (which is therefore regarded as “me”) versus distancing 
oneself from representations of past selves (which are therefore considered as “not-me” 
anymore; see James, 1890, for an early account of the process of “appropriating” vs. 
“rejecting” particular mental contents as part of oneself). In this way, differences in levels of 
activity within CMS may contribute to differentiate between representations of present and 
past selves.  
It is likely that distinct regions within CMS support different subprocesses (Amodio 
and Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2007; Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; 
Schmitz and Johnson, 2007). In a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of self-
referential processing, Northoff et al. (2006) identified three different regional clusters within 
CMS, corresponding to the ventral MPFC, dorsal MPFC, and PCC. Northoff et al. suggested 
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that the ventral and dorsal MPFC are involved in coding and appraising the self-relatedness of 
information and that the PCC sustains the integration of self-related information in the 
individual’s autobiographical context. In this study, these three subregions were more 
activated when reflecting on the present self than when reflecting on the past self, suggesting 
that all three processes may contribute to differentiate between representations of present and 
past selves. Further studies are needed, however, to clarify the specific contribution of each 
subregion to the processing of self across time. 
The question of whether CMS (or some subregions within CMS) play some specific 
roles in self-referential processing or whether their activation during self-referential tasks can 
be entirely explained in terms of more general (non-specific) processes (e.g., metacognitive 
evaluation) is highly debated (see e.g. Amodio and Frith, 2006; Rameson and Lieberman, 
2007, for further discussion of this issue). Thus, an alternative interpretation of the present 
findings would be that differences in activity within CMS across conditions simply reflect the 
differential recruitment of evaluative and reasoning processes (Ruby and Legrand, 2007). As 
people tend to consider situational variability more often when reflecting on their present self 
than when reflecting on their past selves or when reflecting on others (Pronin and Ross, 
2006), it could be argued that participants had to reason more before they could ascribe traits 
to the present self. Although the argument cannot be completely refuted, participants’ 
response times and ratings for difficulty do not fit well with this interpretation. The four 
reflective conditions did not differ in terms of response times, and judgments regarding the 
present self were actually rated as being easier than judgments regarding the past self and did 
not differ from judgments regarding the present other; hence, data concerning response times 
and ratings for difficulty cannot account for the specific pattern of activity observed in CMS 
across the four reflective tasks. Therefore, although the four tasks undoubtedly shared some 
common processes (e.g., metacognitive evaluation), we are inclined to believe that the 
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increased activity in CMS when reflecting on the present self cannot be entirely explained in 
terms of differences in amount of evaluative and reasoning processes.  
In the current study, we contrasted present and past time periods that were 5 years 
apart. It should be noted, however, that the critical factor is probably the perception of 
personal changes between the present and past, rather than the actual time interval. We chose 
a 5-year interval because it included the transition from high school to college, which entails 
significant personal changes in young adults (Libby and Eibach, 2002). Young adults are still 
in a phase of formation and consolidation of identity during the college years, and the ability 
to differentiate between present and past selves probably plays an important role in the 
creation of a stable identity (e.g., by enabling the reflection on personal changes and the 
construction of life narratives that make sense of how one has become the person one 
currently is; McAdams, 2001). After the self-concept has been stabilized, however, people 
may perceive less differences between their present self and their self 5 years ago (unless they 
have encountered important changes in their life circumstances), such that the processing of 
present and past selves may be more similar to each other. 
To avoid any confusion, it should also be noted that our use of the term “present self” 
does not refer to the self as experienced in the immediate moment, that is, “the consciousness 
of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time” (Gallagher, 2000, p. 
15). In this study, the notion of present self refers to the mental representation of one’s own 
current psychological characteristics (e.g., one’s own traits, abilities, and preferences), which 
is constructed from knowledge stored in memory structures (semantic and/or episodic) and 
actually involves some temporal extension. The mental model of the present self contains 
knowledge of who we are in the current “lifetime period,” which boundaries are probably 
delimited by the individual’s current life circumstances (e.g., the period delimited by one’s 
current job or intimate relationships; Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
 18
Strictly speaking, then, what we call “present” actually refers to an extended period of time 
that encompasses the recent past and expected near future. Interestingly, a recent study 
suggests that self-awareness in the immediate moment, as induced by mindfulness training 
(i.e., being aware of one’s sensory experience in the present moment), actually reduces 
memory-based forms of self-reference (such as reflecting on one’s own present traits) and is 
associated with decreased activity in CMS (Farb et al., 2007). Other studies have 
demonstrated that CMS also show decreased activity when people are engaged in demanding 
cognitive tasks as opposed to so-called resting states (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Mason et 
al., 2007; Shulman et al., 1997; Wicker et al., 2003) and there is evidence that the level of 
activity in CMS during rest is positively related to the amount of experienced self-referential 
thoughts (D'Argembeau et al., 2005). These data provide additional evidence for the role of 
CMS in memory-based forms of self-reference, and further suggest that this type of self-
referential processing tends to occur spontaneously in the absence of external demands for 
attention. 
More generally, this study is also in keeping with the idea that the self is not a fixed 
and completely isolated entity; it is a fluctuating, context-dependent process (James, 1890; 
Northoff et al., 2006). According to this view, strength of self-relatedness is distributed along 
a continuum of identifying oneself with (versus distancing oneself from) particular mental 
contents, and what is perceived as self-related may vary as a function of contextual factors. As 
the current study illustrates, we sometimes treat ourselves as an “other” when making self-
judgments (see also Libby and Eibach, 2002; Pronin and Ross, 2006), which is reflected in 
differential activity within CMS. Conversely, we often use information about ourselves when 
we reflect on others, especially when considering people who are perceived to be like 
ourselves (Van Boven and Loewenstein, 2005). Thus, reflecting on similar others engage the 
ventral MPFC more than reflecting on dissimilar others (Mitchell et al., 2006). The relative 
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malleability of the boundary between self and other is also illustrated by a recent study of 
cultural differences in the neural correlates of self-processing. Zhu et al. (2007) observed that 
the MPFC was more activated when thinking about the self versus a close other for Western 
participants but not for Chinese participants, whose self-concept overlaps more with intimate 
others. Thus, what is considered as the “self” might depend on which information one 
identifies with on a particular occasion (i.e., what one includes in the current self-concept), 
which in turn depends on cultural influences, temporal perspectives, and very likely numerous 
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Table 1. fMRI results of the fully factorial (target x time) ANOVA. 
 MNI coordinates   
 x y z F Voxels 
Main effect of target      
    Ventral MPFC -6 46 -10 12.62 26 
    Dorsal MPFC -12 38 40 14.01 16 
    Posterior cingulate -2 -60 24 22.69 1183 
    Lingual gyrus -16 -86 2 23.90 210 
 12 -80 -4 15.25 76 
    R caudate nucleus 8 12 18 15.54 28 
    R inferior frontal gyrus 60 14 10 21.55 198 
    L inferior parietal lobule -58 -42 54 14.67 195 
      
Main effect of time      
    R inferior temporal gyrus 64 -52 -8 27.63 898 
    L inferior temporal gyrus -56 -62 -12 21.87 482 
    L middle temporal gyrus -60 -14 -22 16.13 67 
    R superior temporal gyrus 62 -34 14 14.57 95 
    L postcentral gyrus/superior 
temporal gyrus 
-58 -34 34 12.72 222 
    R inferior/middle frontal gyrus 46 46 6 25.38 749 
    L inferior/middle frontal gyrus -46 42 14 13.64 26 
    R middle frontal gyrus 40 36 40 14.31 26 
    Precuneus 6 -50 72 17.49 121 
 -14 -64 58 14.01 72 
    Posterior cingulate 12 -48 24 16.34 48 
 -8 -54 26 14.23 127 
    R occipital cortex 46 -80 30 36.17 180 
    L occipital cortex 22 -72 58 17.71 402 
      
Interaction      
    Dorsal MPFC 4 46 44 14.11 122 
     6 62 16 14.02 72 
    Posterior cingulate 2 -58 24 12.58 16 
    L inferior frontal gyrus -34 26 -2 13.95 98 
Reported brain regions were significantly activated at p < .001 (uncorrected) with an extent 
threshold of 10 voxels. L = left hemisphere; R = right hemisphere. MPFC = medial prefrontal 




Figure 1. Brain activity associated with reflecting on self and other in the present and 
past. (a) The ventral MPFC, dorsal MPFC, and PCC were commonly activated by the four 
reflective tasks (present self, past self, present other, and past other) relative to the control 
task, as revealed by a conjunction analysis. (b) Nevertheless, activity in the ventral MPFC, 
dorsal MPFC, and PCC varied across reflective conditions, as revealed by a whole-brain 
voxel-wise ANOVA. Displayed at p < .001 (uncorrected) on the mean structural MRI of all 
participants. 
 
Figure 2. Activity in the ventral MPFC, dorsal MPFC, and PCC. Functional ROIs were 
defined using 6 mm radius spheres around the local maxima of (a) ventral MPFC (MNI 
coordinates of peak voxel: -6, 54, -2), (b) dorsal MPFC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -2, 
56, 26), and (c) PCC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -2, -58, 26) activation clusters yielded 
by the whole-brain voxel-wise ANOVA. Effect sizes correspond to average parameter 
estimates for each reflective condition (present self, past self, present other, past other) 
relative to the control condition (valence judgments). Error bars represent the standard error 
of the mean.  
 
Figure 3. Activity in brain regions that showed a significant interaction between target 
and time. Functional ROIs were defined using 6 mm radius spheres around the local maxima 
of (a) dorsal MPFC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: 4, 46, 44), (b) dorsal MPFC (MNI 
coordinates of peak voxel: 6, 62, 16), (c) PCC (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: 2, -58, 24), 
and (d) left inferior frontal gyrus (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -34, 26, 2). Effect sizes 
correspond to average parameter estimates for each reflective condition (present self, past 
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self, present other, past other) relative to baseline. Error bars represent the standard error of 
the mean. 
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